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1 Introduction
It has long been known in the literature on monetary policy that if pol-
icymakers can precommit to a stabilization plan then they can achieve a
significant welfare gain. This is relative to the case of discretionary policy
and in an environment where the current decisions of the forward-looking
private sector are largely determined by their expectations.1
A policymaker who can commit chooses a policy plan once and then
follows this policy at all dates in the future. This policy is the best from
today’s perspective, provided that the precommitment is credible. However,
the policy is time-inconsistent and with the passage of time the policymaker
will have an incentive to renege. Only a policymaker whose promises are
perfectly credible can precommit.
In contrast, a discretionary policy is time-consistent and, as such, is per-
fectly credible. It is known that the policymaker reoptimizes every period.
In the resulting equilibrium, given an opportunity to renege on the expected
policy for the next period, the policymaker will find it optimal to choose the
same policy for that period. The private sector believes all promises as there
are no incentives to renege on them.
A credible commitment policy is able to take advantage of the forward-
looking behavior of the agents by allowing them to understand how the pol-
icy will react to all circumstances in future periods. It can be formulated
in terms of a contingent intertemporal plan, and the plan is linked to the
initial date and has clear relations between consequent periods. This reflects
the ability of the policymaker to manipulate the expectations in a desired
way and convince the private sector to coordinate at the best possible in-
tertemporal outcome, linked to the date of precommitment. In contrast, a
discretionary policy can rather be described as a set of intratemporal contin-
gent rules; the forward-looking private sector recognizes this feature and also
1See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Currie and Levine (1993), Woodford (2003a) among
many others.
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reacts optimally, but it reacts only to the current state, as past promises are
ignored.
Although the different properties of these two benchmark policies having
been known for decades, the issue of practical implementation of such policies
remains controversial. Most discussions concern monetary policy. Although
there is little doubt that major central banks are able to precommit to a
target — as for example an inflation target — the way they actually manage
the expectations of policies to achieve the target remains underexplored. The
key problem with the acceptance of the theoretical concept of commitment
policy as a practical option has always been its time-inconsistency. It is well
understood that the policymaker will have an incentive to renege at every
consequent period. This is because the private sector will have done part of
the ‘work’ of the policymaker by setting its expectations in a particular way.
From this perspective the policymaker would gain from exploiting the expec-
tations of the private sector. Also, it is because the policymaker may have
some additional and sudden ‘distractions’, like the task of maintaining finan-
cial stability. Issues with financial stability may require sudden monetary
loosening regardless of the inflation record at the time.
Despite the well understood difficulties with the ability of a central bank
to precommit to a policy plan, the statements of major central banks about
their practices differ widely. The early statements do not suggest that banks
precommit to a plan which is chosen once and forever. In particular, after
the Bank of England gained its independence, King (1997) proclaimed a
regime of ‘constrained discretion’. In these statements the word ‘discretion’,
which does not typically assume an ability to manipulate expectations over
time, has rather been used to acknowledge inevitable ‘distractions’. On the
other hand, the word ‘constrained’ was meant to mean that the ‘distractions’
will not dominate. The Bank of England would, therefore, not pursue a
short-term gain at the expense of mid-term inflation stability. This was
meant to improve the credibility of the policy in the eyes of the private
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sector. Nothing in King (1997) suggests that the word ‘discretion’ is meant
to exclude the possibility that the Bank of England would not be able to
manipulate the private sector’s expectations, and use information from a
longer period of time, rather than just within the current period. Bernanke
and Mishkin (1997) give similar arguments to describe the US monetary
policy as discretionary. Givens (2012) and Coroneo, Corradi, and Santos
Monteiro (2012) estimate that the Volker-Bernanke period in the US is best
described by the discretionary monetary regime.
More recently, the statements of some European central banks have either
described their current monetary policy as policy under commitment, or come
very close to doing so. The intertemporal feature of a commitment policy is
being communicated as a ‘predictable response pattern’. See Bergo (2007)
for the view of the Norges Bank and Svensson (2009) for policy recommenda-
tions for the Riksbank to follow in the footsteps of Norges Bank by generating
policy projections as optimal projections. Using medium-scale macro models,
Bache, Brubakk, and Maith (2010) for Norges Bank and Adolfson, Laseen,
Linde, and Svensson (2011) for Riksbank, find that the past policy of these
banks is better explained as optimal policy under commitment than as simple
rules.
The recent documents may imply that the Bank of England takes a similar
view on the issue (Tucker, 2006; Stockton, 2012). A clear target and a public
commitment to anchor inflation expectations in line with this target, together
with being understood to be willing to do whatever is necessary to achieve this
goal, not just in the current period but in all periods, is critical to achieving
credibility. Once credibility is achieved, a central bank that wants to maintain
the credibility of its promises would then clearly recognize that reneging on
past promises would lead to a loss of credibility. One might interpret this
statement that, in effect, the Bank of England was able to precommit to the
policy and then chose not to renege on its previously chosen intertemporal
policy. It is an empirical question, however, whether the Bank of England
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was able to manage the private sector’s expectations as if the Bank could
not renege on its promises under any circumstances.
Fiscal policy arrangements are much less discussed in the literature, al-
though they may play an important role in identifying the monetary policy
regime as well as parameters of the model. Partly because of institutional
arrangements, it is believed that fiscal policy is too inflexible to be used
for active stabilization. However, recent developments in the world, recent
episodes of using fiscal policy as a stabilization device, have shown that there
might be a more active role for fiscal policy.2 A more focussed discussion on
the institutional design of stabilizing fiscal policy may not be too far into the
future.
The main focus of this paper is the identification of the degree of pol-
icy precommitment in the UK. We work with the standard microfounded
model of a small open economy.3 We use the theoretical framework of non-
cooperative monetary and fiscal discretionary interactions, as in Blake and
Kirsanova (2011) and Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010), and we also develop
the appropriate theoretical framework for non-cooperative commitment. The
policymakers are assumed to minimize the microfounded social welfare loss
function except that they can change the relative weight on inflation stabi-
lization and introduce an additional penalty on the excess volatility of policy
instruments. We estimate structural parameters of the model and weights
of policy objectives under two alternative assumptions about the policymak-
ers’ degree of precommitment using the Bayesian approach (see e.g. An and
Schorfheide, 2007).
We demonstrate that the monetary and fiscal policy regime in the UK
under the assumption of fiscal leadership can best be described by a regime
2Recent examples include Economic Stimulus Act 2008, American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009 in the US, and the establishment of the Office of Budget Responsi-
bility in the UK. See Osborne (2008), see also Wyplosz (2005) and Kirsanova, Leith, and
Wren-Lewis (2006) for more formal discussion.
3We build on models in Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008), Lubik and Schorfheide (2005,
2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010a,b).
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of optimal policy under discretion: the probability that the actual data were
generated by a model with optimal commitment policy, rather than by a
model with optimal discretionary policy, is less than 1.0%. Both policymakers
put a smaller weight on inflation stabilization than is socially optimal, and
the fiscal policymaker pays much less attention to inflation stabilization than
the monetary policymaker. We assess the empirical fit of an optimizing
microfounded model based on first and second order moments and use DSGE-
VAR methodology (Del Negro and Schorpfheide, 2004) to investigate the
degree of misspecification of the model under different policies. In particular,
we show that the DSGE model imposes useful restrictions to improve the
in-sample predictive properties of the Bayesian VAR model. Finally, we
demonstrate that the fiscal solvency constraint plays an important role as an
identifying restriction for both fiscal and monetary policy reactions as well
as model parameters: excluding the fiscal block from the system leads to
greater degree of misspecification of the pure monetary model.
The focus of this paper is different from the one of Fragetta and Kirsanova
(2010). We identify the degree of policy precommitment, while Fragetta and
Kirsanova (2010) identify the degree of leadership and work with a discre-
tionary model only.4 Unlike Givens (2012) we use a microfounded model, and
account for non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy interactions which al-
lows a more complete description of the UK macroeconomic policy regime.
Finally, different from Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010) and Givens (2012) we
process the data in a different way: following Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
we introduce a non-stationary world-wide technology shock which substan-
tially reduces the model misspecification.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the
model and describe policy interactions under commitment and discretion.
Section 3 explains the empirical methodology, the choice of priors and the
4In contrast to the model in Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010), our model accounts for
habit persistence and inflation inertia.
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data. The results are discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. Appen-
dices contain details of derivations and the theoretical framework for the two
policy regimes in a general rational expectations linear-quadratic framework.
2 The Model
We build on models by Gali andMonacelli (2005, 2008), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2005, 2007), Justiniano and Preston (2010a,b) modified to include fiscal pol-
icy. The following section presents key structural equations of a small open
economy model, which allows for habit formation and price indexation.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit-continuum representative household, by
a unit-continuum monopolistically competitive firm, and by two policymak-
ers: the government and the central bank.
Each household k maximizes the following objective:
W = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(Xkt /AWt)
1−σ
1− σ
+ χ
(Gt/AWt)
1−σ
1− σ
−
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
. (1)
HereXkt = C
k
t −hκCt−1 is the habit-adjusted consumption, Ct−1 ≡
∫ 1
0
Ckt−1dk
is the cross-sectional average of consumption, Nt is labour supply of a rep-
resentative household and Gt is consumption of public goods. Parameter
0 ≤ h ≤ 1 measures the degree of habit persistence, parameter β is the
household discount rate, ϕ is the elasticity of labour supply and σ is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Parameter χ is the scaling factor for the
utility of consuming public goods. In order to guarantee that the model has
a balanced growth path, we assume that households derive utility from ef-
fective consumption relative to the world-wide level of technology, AWt. The
technology shock AWt is non-stationary, with growth rate zt = AWt/AWt−1.
Parameter κ is the steady state value of zt.
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Household k’s consumption, Ckt , is an aggregate of the continuum of goods
i ∈ [0, 1] produced in the home country (indexed H) and abroad (indexed F )
Ct =
(
(1− α)
1
ηC
η−1
η
Ht + α
1
ηC
η−1
η
Ft
) η
η−1
,
where 0 ≤ α < 1 is the import share and η > 0 is the intratemporal elas-
ticity of substitution between home and foreign consumption goods. CH is a
composite of domestically produced goods given by
CHt =
(∫ 1
0
CHt(z)
ǫ−1
ǫ dz
) ǫ
ǫ−1
, (2)
where z denotes the good’s type or variety and ǫ is the intratemporal substi-
tution between domestically produced goods. Similarly, the aggregate CFt is
an aggregate across overseas countries i
CFt =
(∫ 1
0
C
ǫ−1
ǫ
it di
) ǫ
ǫ−1
,
where Cit is an aggregate similar to (2). Households allocate aggregate ex-
penditures based on the demand functions:
CHt = (1− α)
(
PHt
Pt
)−η
Ct and CFt = α
(
PFt
Pt
)−η
Ct,
where PHt, PFt are domestic and foreign goods price indices and
Pt =
(
(1− α)P 1−ηHt + αP
1−η
F t
) 1
1−η
is the consumption-based price index.
Consumers face the following aggregated budget constraint
PtC
k
t + Et{Qt,t+1A
k
t+1} = A
k
t + (1− τ t)
(
WtN
k
t +Υ
k
t
)
+ Tt
where Akt+1 is the nominal payoff of portfolio held at the end of period t,
Wt are wages, τ t is the income tax rate and Υ are profits, Tt are lump-sum
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transfers paid by the government. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for
one-period-ahead payoffs.
In the maximization problem households take the processes for Ct−1, Wt,
Tt and the initial asset position A
k
−1 as given. The optimization produces
the standard first order conditions
1
1 + it
= βEt
(
PtAWt
Pt+1AWt+1
(
Xt/AWt
Xt+1/AWt+1
)σ)
(3)
Wt
Pt
= AWt
(Xt/AWt)
σNt
ϕ
(1− τ t)
(4)
where 1+it = (Et{Qt,t+1})
−1 is the gross return on a riskless one period bond
paying off a unit of domestic currency in period t + 1. We omit superscript
k as all households are identical.
2.2 Firms
Domestic differentiated goods are produced by monopolistically competitive
firms, which use labour as the only factor of production. The production
technology is given by
Yt (i) = AWtAHtNt (i) (5)
where Yt (i) is the amount of output produced by firm i in period t, Nt (i) is
the amount of labour employed by firm i in period t, and AHt is home-specific
stationary technology shock.
We assume the familiar Calvo-type price setting (Calvo, 1983). A firm
will not reset the price the next period with given probability θ.When firm i
does not reset price, the price is costlessly adjusted with steady state rate of
inflation Π. When firm i resets price, with probability 1− ζ it chooses price
P fHt which maximizes
max
P
f
Ht(i)
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
Yt+k (i)P
f
Ht (i)Π
k −Wt+kNt+k (i)
)
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subject to demand system
Yt+k (i) =
[
pHt (i) Π
k
PHt+k
]−ǫ
Yt+k
and production function (5). The solution to this optimization problem is
given by
P fHt
PHt
=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
K1t
K2t
, (6)
where K1t and K2t satisfy
γβK1t+1
(
PHt+1
ΠPHt
)ǫ
= K1t −
(
Xkt
AWt
)−σ
Yt
AWt
Wt
PtAWtAHt
, (7)
γβK2t+1
(
PHt+1
ΠPHt
)ǫ−1
= K2t −
(
Xkt
AWt
)−σ
PHt
Pt
Yt
AWt
. (8)
When a firm resets price, then with probability ζ it chooses the new price
P bHt according to a simple rule of thumb
P bHt = P
∗
Ht−1ΠHt−1, (9)
where index of the reset prices P ∗t−1 is given by
P ∗1−ǫHt = (1− ζ)
(
P fHt
)1−ǫ
+ ζ
(
P bHt
)1−ǫ
. (10)
With share θ of firms keeping last period’s price and share (1− θ) of firms
setting a new price, the law of motion of aggregate price index PHt is
P 1−ǫHt = (1− θ) (P
∗
Ht)
1−ǫ + θ (ΠPHt−1)
1−ǫ . (11)
Finally, the evolution of price dispersion ∆t =
1∫
0
(
pHt (i)
PHt
)−ǫ
di is given by
∆t = (1− θ) (1−ζ)
(
P fHt
PHt
)−ǫ
+(1− θ) ζ
(
P bHt
PHt
)−ǫ
+θ
(
PHt
PHt−1
)ǫ
∆t−1. (12)
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2.3 Risk-sharing, Market Clearing and Private Sector
Equilibrium
The bilateral terms of trade measure foreign country goods prices relative to
home goods prices. The effective terms of trade St are given by
St =
PFt
PHt
,
and the real exchange rate Qt is defined as
Qt =
P ∗t Et
Pt
,
where Et is the nominal exchange rate. Assuming that the home country is
small and the law of one price holds we obtain
St ≡
PFt
PHt
=
P ∗t Et
PH,t
=
Pt
PH,t
P ∗t Et
Pt
=
Pt
PH,t
Qt.
The Euler equation for the rest of the world can be written as
1
1 + i∗t
= βEt
(
X∗t /AWt
X∗t+1/AWt+1
)σ (
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)
.
Combining two consumption Euler equations with the uncovered interest rate
parity
1 + it
1 + i∗t
=
Et+1
Et
,
yields the international risk sharing relationship
Xt/AWt
X∗t /AWt
Q
− 1
σ
t =
Xt+1/AWt+1
X∗t+1/AWt+1
Q
− 1
σ
t+1.
Goods market clearing requires
Yt(j) = CHt(j) +
∫ 1
0
Cit(j)di+Gt(j),
11
where
CiHt(j) = α
(
PHt(j)
PHt
)−ǫ(
PHt
EitP it
)−1
Cit .
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by the
minimization of total costs,
Gt(j) =
(
pHt(j)
PHt
)−ǫ
Gt.
Substituting everything into the market clearing condition yields
Yt(j) =
(
PHt(j)
PHt
)−ǫ [
(1− α)
PtCt
PHt
+ α
∫ 1
0
EitP
i
tC
i
t
PHt
di+Gt
]
.
Aggregation, using Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
ǫ−1
ǫ dj
) ǫ
ǫ−1
yields the aggregate demand
equation
Yt = (1− α)
Pt
PHt
Ct + αC
∗
t +Gt. (13)
Similarly, aggregation of production function (5) yields the aggregate pro-
duction function
Yt = AWtAHt
Nt
∆t
. (14)
We assume that all public debt consists of riskless one-period bonds.
Therefore, the nominal value of end-of-period public debt Bt evolves accord-
ing to the following law of motion:
Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + PHtGt − τ tPHtYt. (15)
For analytical convenience, we define Bt =
(1+it−1)Bt−1
Pt−1AWt
as a measure of real
government debt. Because AWt and Bt are observed at the beginning of
period t, equation (15) can be rewritten as
Bt+1
AWt+1
AWt
= (1 + it)
(
Bt
PHt−1
PHt
− τ t
Yt
AWt
+
Gt
AWt
)
. (16)
Finally, the private sector equilibrium { Xt
AWt
, Wt
Pt
, Nt, Yt, K1t, K2t, p
f
Ht, P
b
t ,
P ∗t , Πt, ∆t, Bt} is determined by equations (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (16).
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2.4 Linearization
We proceed by log-linearizing the model equations around the balanced
growth path. Our model imposes common steady state real interest rates,
inflation rates, growth rates and technologies. Because the model contains a
non-stationary component, the world-wide technology shockAWt, we detrend
the affected variables by their specific growth components beforehand.
We denote by lower-case letters the stationary transformation of corre-
sponding variables, by dividing them by a common numeraire, AWt. There-
fore, we denote xt =
Xt
AWt
, yt =
Yt
AWt
, gt =
Gt
AWt
, ct =
Ct
AWt
. We present the
model in a form where all variables are in log-deviations from the steady
state, and for any variable ut with steady state u¯ we denote uˆt = log
(
ut
u¯
)
.
The linearized system which describes the evolution of the economy can
be written as
πˆHt = β
θ
Φ
EtπˆHt+1 +
ζ
Φ
πˆHt−1 +
λ
Φ
(
σxˆt + ϕyˆt + αSˆt (17)
− (ϕ+ 1) AˆHt
)
+ ηπt
xˆt = Etxˆt+1 −
1
σ
(
ıˆt − EtπˆHt+1 + αSˆt − αEtSˆt+1 − Etzˆt+1
)
(18)
Sˆt =
σ
(1− h) (1− α)
(
cˆt − hcˆt−1 − cˆ
∗
t + hcˆ
∗
t−1
)
(19)
xˆt =
1
(1− h)
(cˆt − hcˆt−1) +
h
(1− h)
zˆt (20)
yˆt = α (2− α) ηSˆt + (1− α)cˆt + αcˆ
∗
t +
g¯
c¯
gˆyt (21)
b˜t+1 =
1
β
(
b˜t −
B¯
y¯Π
πˆHt +
g¯
y¯
gˆyt −
(
τ −
g¯
y¯
)
yˆt
)
+
B¯
y¯Π
ıˆt (22)
−
B¯
y¯Π
Etzˆt+1
Ψt = yˆt − yˆt−1 + zˆt (23)
Ωt = gˆ
y
t − gˆ
y
t−1 + ηgt (24)
Here gˆyt = gˆt − yˆt is spending to output ratio, or the government share, and
b˜t =
B¯
y¯Π
log
(
Bt
B¯
)
is a measure of real debt. Variables Ψt and Ωt are the growth
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rate of output and of the government share correspondingly. Parameters are
Φ = ζ + θ− ζθ+ θβζ, λ = (1− θ) (1− θβ) (1− ζ). All microfounded shocks
are assumed to follow AR(1) process:
AˆHt = ρaAˆHt−1 + ηat (25)
cˆ∗t = ρccˆ
∗
t−1 + ηct (26)
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + ηzt (27)
where ηat, ηct and ηzt are i.i.d. Note that additional to three microfounded
shocks, AˆHt, zˆt, and cˆ
∗
t , we have added shocks ηπt and ηgt into the final spec-
ification of the system. Shock ηπt captures inefficient variations in mark ups.
It is assumed to be an i.i.d. to allow easier identification of the degree of infla-
tion inertia. Shock ηgt captures the non-systematic part of fiscal policy, the
discrepancy between the observed government share and the unobservable
policy instrument. As a measurement error, ηgt is assumed to be i.i.d.
2.5 Policy
2.5.1 Social Welfare
The aggregated household utility (1) implies the following social welfare loss
function
W = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
π2Ht +
ζ
θ (1− ζ)
(πHt − πHt−1)
2
+L
(
xˆt, cˆt, yˆt , gˆ
y
t , AˆHt, cˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
t−1
))
where L
(
xˆt, cˆt, yˆt , gˆ
y
t , AˆHt, cˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
t−1
)
is a collection of quadratic terms which
can be rearranged to describe ‘gap’ targets, see Appendix A.
2.5.2 Policy Objectives
It is often suggested that realistic policymakers are not benevolent. There are
some theoretical reasons for introducing additional objectives and for distort-
ing social weights of a discretionary policymaker. A discretionary monetary
14
policymaker can reduce the ‘stabilization bias’5 in several ways. For example,
Woodford (2003b) demonstrates that if the discretionary monetary policy-
maker adopts an additional interest rate smoothing target then the policy
becomes ‘history-dependent’ and the dynamics of the economy under dis-
cretion is similar to the one under commitment policy, with higher level of
social welfare attained. A similar result is demonstrated in Vestin (2006):
introducing the price level target into the monetary policymaker’s objectives
improves the social welfare too. Also, following the famous result of Barro
and Gordon (1983), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) show that the discre-
tionary monetary authority which puts higher than socially optimal weight
on inflation stabilization target can achieve the same level of welfare as under
the optimal precommitment-to-rules policy.6
The policymakers may not be benevolent because of some institutional
restrictions, both under commitment and discretion. For example, fiscal in-
strument smoothing may result from fiscal policy being ‘delayed’. All spend-
ing decisions should pass the parliament scrutiny. In order to avoid large
changes in inappropriate times, it may be optimal to propose only relatively
small changes. In our framework, such policy can be described by introduc-
ing a penalty on the change of fiscal instrument. Similarly, a debt target can
reflect some international agreements. It can also help to avoid large risk
premium, which cannot be described by this model.
To account for possible delegation schemes and institutional restrictions,
we assume a more general form of the monetary policymakers’ objective
function in our empirical part of the paper
WM = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ΦπM
(
πˆ2Ht +
ζ
θ (1− ζ)
(πˆHt − πˆHt−1)
2
)
+L
(
xˆt, cˆt, yˆt , gˆ
y
t , AˆHt, xˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
t
)
+Φ∆I (∆ıˆt)
2
)
.
5See Svensson (1997).
6For other policy delegation proposals see e.g. Svensson (1997), Walsh (2003) and
Woodford (2003b).
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Here we add additional interest rate smoothing weight Φ∆I and allow for
‘inflation conservatism’ ΦπM .
We adopt the same general form of policy objectives for fiscal policy:
WF = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ΦπF
(
πˆ2Ht +
ζ
θ (1− ζ)
(πˆHt − πˆHt−1)
2
)
+L
(
xˆt, cˆt, yˆt , gˆ
y
t , AˆHt, xˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
t
)
+Φ∆G (∆gˆ
y
t )
2 +ΦBb
2
t
)
,
where we account for ‘inflation conservatism’ ΦπF and instrument smoothing
∆gˆyt , but also add debt target ΦB. Both policymakers are not assumed to
modify social ‘gap’ targets L
(
xˆt, cˆt, yˆt , gˆ
y
t , AˆHt, xˆ
∗
t , cˆ
∗
t
)
; their change might
move us too far from the original microfounded criterion and might not allow
us to make a simple interpretation of results.7
2.5.3 Strategic Interactions
We assume that the monetary policymaker uses the nominal interest rate, it,
as its instrument, and the fiscal policymaker uses the government share, gyt .
8
Both policymakers act non-cooperatively in order to stabilize the economy
against shocks.
We assume that the fiscal policymaker acts as an intraperiod leader and
the monetary authority acts as an intraperiod follower. (Fragetta and Kir-
sanova (2010) show that the model of fiscal leadership gives better fit to
the UK data than the model of simultaneous moves under discretion.) This
assumption implies that the leader, the fiscal authority, knows the reaction
function of the monetary authority and takes it into account when formulat-
ing policy.
If both policy authorities are benevolent, and the steady state level of
debt is not too high, then in the resulting equilibrium the optimizing mon-
7See Dennis (2006), Ilbas (2010) and Givens (2012) who directly estimate the relative
weights of the authority’s ad hoc loss function.
8We follow Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008) in the choice of fiscal instrument. The
empirical evidence in Favero and Monacelli (2005), Taylor (2000) and Auerbach (2003),
for example, also suggests that government spending does move.
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etary policymaker reacts to inflation nearly in the same way as if the debt
accumulation problem were not the part of the problem, and the optimizing
fiscal policymaker adjusts the fiscal instrument to keep debt under control,
see e.g. Blake and Kirsanova (2011). Moreover, the level of debt is opti-
mally brought back only slowly — under commitment it is just not allowed
to explode — so the optimal volatility of fiscal instrument is relatively small.
This optimal ‘division of responsibilities’, where the burden of economic sta-
bilization is optimally carried by the monetary policymaker, describes the
standard case of benevolent policymakers.9
Once the policy objectives are made distinct, the optimizing policymakers
may engage into a fight, each trying to offset the harm done by the other. This
fight, however, is more likely to happen if the authorities move simultane-
ously, see Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Blake and Kirsanova (2011). The
regime of fiscal leadership considered here is likely to mitigate the conflict. If
the fiscal policymaker has lesser need to stabilize inflation but prefers faster
stabilization of output gap than the monetary policymaker does, it knows
that an increase in government spending will not produce higher output but
just higher interest rate, so the fiscal policymaker optimally refrains from
moving the fiscal instrument excessively, and concentrates on debt stabiliza-
tion. If the fiscal authority is able to conduct itself as an intraperiod leader,
then it will willingly allow the monetary authority to carry out almost all of
the required macroeconomic stabilization.
Policymakers who act under commitment are able to manipulate expec-
tations of the private sector along the whole dynamic path. The monetary
policymaker takes the state of fiscal policy as given and precommits to policy
taking into account the forward-looking behavior of the private sector and
the evolution of predetermined states. The fiscal policymaker also takes into
account the forward-looking behavior of the private sector and the evolution
9See the discussion in Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2009). If both policymakers
are benevolent and there is a unique equilibrium then the leadership does not matter, of
course.
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of predetermined states, but it also takes into account the reaction function
of the monetary policymaker. Both policymakers precommit once, in the
initial period, and then follow their (initially optimal) plans. The private
sector’s expectations are among the policymakers’ choice variables so that
the best-at-point-of-precommitment outcome is achieved. The formal treat-
ment of non-cooperative optimization under commitment is relegated into
Appendix B.
In contrast, discretionary policymakers reoptimize (or change office) every
period, and the forward-looking sector knows this. As a result, all agents
choose their optimal reactions as functions of current predetermined states
only.10 The optimal reaction rule of the private sector feeds back on all ob-
served states, including policy. The monetary policymaker takes into account
this reaction function of the private sector, as well as predetermined states
and fiscal policy. The fiscal policymaker takes into account reaction rules of
the monetary policymaker and the private sector. Although the policymak-
ers cannot affect expectations of the private sector to the extent available
under commitment, they can influence the endogenous predetermined state,
which evolution is taken into account by the private sector. Similarly, the
expectations of the monetary policymaker are affected by actions of the fis-
cal policymaker through their effect on endogenous predetermined states.
The formal treatment of non-cooperative optimization under discretion is
presented in Blake and Kirsanova (2011).
Solving the optimization problem yields the following policy reaction
functions:
ıˆt = rzηz,t + raηa,t + ry∗ηy0∗,t + ry1∗ηy∗,t−1 + rr ıˆt−1 + rggˆ
y
t−1 (28)
+rππˆHt−1 + rccˆt−1 + rbb˜t + rΛΛmt
gˆyt = gzηz,t + gaηa,t + gy∗ηy0∗,t + gy1∗ηy∗,t−1 + gr ıˆt−1 + gg gˆ
y
t−1 (29)
+gππˆHt−1 + gccˆt−1 + gbb˜t + gΛΛft
10We assume no memory.
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where all coefficients are non-linear functions of structural and policy parame-
ters. Terms rΛΛmt and gΛΛft are linear functions of predetermined Lagrange
multipliers and are only included in case of commitment, see Appendix B,
Proposition 1.
3 Estimation Strategy and Empirical Imple-
mentation
3.1 Empirical Specification and Data
Using DYNARE toolkit (Juillard, 2005) we estimate the model using Bayesian
techniques that have been developed to estimate and evaluate DSGE models
(see e.g. An and Schorfheide, 2007).
The empirical specification of the system for estimation consists of equa-
tions (17)-(27) and two policy rules in the form of (28)-(29). The observable
variables are domestic inflation, πˆHt, the growth rate of output, Ψt, nomi-
nal interest rate, ıˆt, terms of trade, Sˆt, and the growth rate of government
share, Ωt. Government debt is treated as unobservable variable.
11 In case
of commitment the set of unobservable endogenous variables also includes
predetermined Lagrange multipliers. We keep very tight restrictions on the
number of shocks being equal to the number of observed variables; this allows
us to asses possible misspecifications using the DSGE-VAR approach as in
Del Negro and Schorpfheide (2004). The estimation of commitment assumes
that the commitment policy was announced at some point that predates the
sample, at a date which we do not have to identify in estimation. Therefore,
we chose to initialize the predetermined Lagrange multipliers to their steady
state values when we start the Kalman filter.12
In order to approximate variables πˆHt, ıˆt, Sˆt,Ψt and Ωt we use seasonally
11The model is formulated in terms of quarterly debt. Because of the data availability
on the very short-term debt we treat this variable as unobservable.
12Alternatively, Ilbas (2010) and Adolfson et al. (2011) use presample to initialize the
Lagrange multipliers. Both approaches give very similar results.
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adjusted quarterly data on real GDP, the GDP deflator, nominal interest
rates on three month Treasury bills, current government spending on goods
and services, and the data on exports and imports of goods and services at
current market prices and as chained volume measures. All data series are
obtained from the Office of National Statistics Database.13 Home inflation
rates are defined as log differences of the GDP deflator and multiplied by
100 to obtain quarterly percentage rates. The data on the terms of trade
are constructed as the relative price of export and import. The estimation
is based on demeaned data.
We study the post-ERM period 1992:1-2008:2. During this period the UK
maintained flexible exchange rate regime, with explicit inflation targeting in
post-1997 period. We, therefore, effectively assume that during the whole
sample period the monetary authorities, whether independent or as part of
the government, were trying to maintain stability of the economy as described
by low and stable inflation and low unemployment. Although the period
covers several governments, we nevertheless estimate the fiscal regime ‘on
average’. Being the intraperiod leader, the fiscal policymaker is expected to
remain relatively inactive, concentrating on keeping the debt accumulation
under control.
3.2 Priors
We keep a number of parameters fixed, as some of them are related to steady
state values and cannot be estimated from a log-linearized demeaned model.
We calibrate the discount factor, β, to be 0.99, which implies an annual steady
state interest rate of about 4%. The steady state tax rate is set to 0.35,
the steady state government share is set to 0.2 and the steady state debt to
GDP ratio is set to 0.1, as the UK data suggest.14 We set the intratemporal
13The ONS codes for the data series are GZSN, YBHA, AJRP, YBGB, IKBI, IKBH,
IKBL, IKBK.
14We work with one-period debt stock, its proportion in the total debt stock is relatively
small over the observed period.
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substitution elasticity η = 1, as did Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
Table 1 summarizes prior distributions for structural parameters, policy
objectives and shocks. They are consistent with priors used in e.g. Smets
and Wouters (2003) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005). We set relatively
wide priors for all parameters which affect persistence of the propagation
mechanism: the price indexation parameter ζ is beta-distributed with mean
0.5 and standard error of 0.25, and the habit persistence parameter h is beta-
distributed with mean 0.5 and standard error or 0.10. Priors for elasticities
σ and ϕ are consistent with e.g. Liu and Mumtaz (2011), Justiniano and
Preston (2010a), Adjemian, Paries, and Moyen (2008).
Parameters ΦπM , Φ∆I , ΦπF , Φ∆G and ΦB measure the extent of deviation
of the empirical policy objectives from those microfounded. We set gamma
distributions for the ‘conservatism’ parameters, ΦπM and ΦπF . The mean
prior of ΦπM is set to 1.0, and the mean prior of ΦπM is set to 0.5 to reflect
our belief that the monetary policymaker is likely to prioritize inflation sta-
bilization, while the fiscal policymaker may have less of priorities to stabilize
inflation. However, both prior distributions are very wide and allow both
posterior means to exceed one.
The interest rate smoothing target weight Φ∆I can be interpreted as a
measure of importance of this target relative to the inflation stabilization
target. It is widely accepted that the monetary authorities find the infla-
tion target as most important, and it might be difficult to justify the mean
posterior of Φ∆I if it exceeds one. Note, however, that Φ∆I directly affects
the instrument inertia in the implied policy reaction function. The empirical
reaction function may not be fully determined by either commitment or dis-
cretion, it may have some non-strategic components which we cannot identify
within this framework. The presence of such non-strategic components may
imply a large estimate of Φ∆I . Following Dennis (2006) and Ilbas (2010) we
do not constrain Φ∆I to be less than one. We choose gamma distribution
with mean 0.75 and standard error of 0.25; this gives us a very wide prior.
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There is no wide agreement that the policy weight on instrument smooth-
ing in fiscal objectives should not dominate the inflation target. However,
because we remove the stochastic trend from the government share over the
observed period, we do not expect to find a great deal of the fiscal instru-
ment smoothing. We do not expect to find an important debt stabilization
target either, given the observed high and persistent debt to output ratio in
the UK. To reflect these beliefs we choose gamma distribution with mean
0.1 and standard error of 0.09 for Φ∆G and choose gamma distribution with
mean 1× 10−3 and standard error of 9× 10−4 for ΦB.
All shock variances are assumed to be distributed as inverted Gamma
distribution. Their means are taken from similar studies, predominantly
from Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), Dennis (2006), Ilbas (2010) and Givens
(2012).
Finally, some priors are more dispersed than others. Note that more
diffuse priors do not necessarily deliver higher marginal data density. While
the in-sample fit improves slightly, wider priors relax some of the parameter
restrictions and this leads to a larger penalty for model complexity. The
second effect can outweigh the first one and this leads to an overall fall in the
marginal data density. We therefore, make a prior more concentrated when
such effect is evident.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, described e.g. in Lubik and Schorfheide
(2005), are used to generate draws from the posterior distribution of model
parameters. We present the summary statistics in Tables 2-4.
Overall, the estimates of the structural parameters fall within plausible
ranges, consistent with the most of literature, and are similar for commitment
and discretion, see Table 2.
22
The estimate of the Calvo parameter θ implies that prices remain fixed
between two and three quarters. The price indexation parameter ζ is esti-
mated rather moderate: when firms adjust the price, less than half of them
change prices optimally, rather than adopt a rule of thumb and index the
growth rate of prices to the past observed inflation rate. These estimates are
consistent with those obtained in Lubik and Schorfheide (2005).
We do not find evidence of substantial habit persistence, measured by
parameter h; this is similar to findings in Liu and Mumtaz (2011) for the
UK and in Justiniano and Preston (2010b) for New Zealand. The estimate
of the preference parameter α is lower than the UK import share, and this
is consistent with much of the open economy literature, see e.g. Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010a). The inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is consistent with those obtained
in the literature, e.g. Justiniano and Preston (2010a,b).
These results are interrelated and are the consequence of fitting equation
(19) to the data. If we treat the terms of trade as a non-observable variable
then the tension between the prior and posterior for α, σ and h is greatly
reduced.
The marginal data density is relatively flat in the inverse elasticity of
labour supply, φ, as the posterior distribution of φ is not much different from
the prior.
All priors for policy parameters do not conflict with the data, see Table
3. The mean posterior of ΦπM is only slightly less than the mean prior, and
the posterior distribution is only slightly more concentrated than the prior
distribution. It implies that the weight on inflation stabilization is consistent
with the microfounded weight, and is relatively large. There is no tension
between the prior and posterior of Φ∆I : although the mean posterior is
slightly higher than the mean prior, it remains below one and the confidence
interval is not too wide.
The policy priorities of the fiscal policymaker are described by relative
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weights ΦπF ,Φ∆G and ΦB. The posterior of the conservatism weight, ΦπF , is
more concentrated than the (very wide) prior, with the mean shifted towards
zero. This implies that the relative weight on inflation target is lower than
the microfoundations suggest. The fiscal smoothing weight Φ∆G is very small,
this is likely to be a consequence of the chosen detrending method. We did
not find any evidence that the fiscal policymakers have the debt target, ΦB.
The estimates of standard errors of structural shocks are in line with
those obtained in most of the literature, see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), for equally stylized models. Standard errors
of technology and cost push shocks are relatively low and, similar to results
in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), the standard error of the foreign demand
shock is relatively high. The foreign demand shock is likely to accumulate
various misspecifications of our simple model.
4.2 Commitment vs. Discretion
If we allow for policy delegation, then the dynamics of the economy under
discretion can be made very similar to the one under commitment.15 Ad-
ditionally, if the private sector is predominantly backward-looking then the
difference between the dynamics of the economy under commitment and dis-
cretion is small. Our model has both these features. First, we have estimated
some degree of habit persistence and inflation inertia. Second, we have also
estimated different parameters of policy objectives of the two policymakers.
It might become difficult to distinguish between the two policy regimes.
Nevertheless, there are some differences between the estimated parame-
ters under discretion and commitment. First, to fit the same data the price-
setters under commitment reset prices more frequently, but most of these
changes are based on the rule of thumb rather than on optimality. The mean
15Interest rate smoothing, price level targeting, speed-limit policy are all designed to
approximate the commitment equilibrium in a simple New Keynesian model. In models
with optimizing fiscal policy such result may be less clear if the policymakers choose to
engage into a fight.
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share of the rule of thumb setters under commitment is 10% greater than
under discretion. Second, the monetary policymaker under discretion has a
bigger penalty on the interest rate smoothing target than the policymaker
under commitment. In this model, given the same policy objectives and
parameters of the model for commitment and discretion, the optimal policy
under commitment generates lower volatility of inflation and higher volatility
of interest rate. At the same time, inflation is found to be more sensitive to
interest rate changes under commitment than under discretion. Therefore,
in order to fit both models to the same data on interest rate and inflation, we
have to have a lower weight on interest rate smoothing under commitment.
An increase in this weight under commitment generates lower volatility of
interest rate and much higher volatility of inflation which is rejected by the
data.
In order to improve our understanding of the dynamics of economy under
the two policies we compute impulse response functions. Figure 1 reports the
responses of endogenous variables to one-standard-deviation shocks. Each
subplot plots results for commitment and discretion together and shows mean
responses of observable variables together with 5th and 95th percentiles. We
only plot first ten quarters, as all variables are converging back to their base
lines in the long run.16
A positive home technology shock AH reduces the marginal cost and
drives inflation down. The monetary policymaker reduces interest rate so
consumption and output rise. The real exchange rate depreciates. Fiscal
policymaker increases spending such that the government share rises. Un-
der commitment, interest rate is reduced by more, which leads to higher
consumption, inflation overshooting and to a reduction in government debt.
An increase in the world output ηy∗ increases foreign demand for both
home and foreign goods. This results in an appreciation of the real exchange
16Because the debt target ΦB = 0, although very small, the debt under commitment is
not a unit-root variable.
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rate. Because of the risk sharing assumption consumers increase consump-
tion of foreign goods which leads to an initial reduction in domestic output.
Inflation falls and the interest rate is reduced. Interest rate under commit-
ment is reduced by more, this results in inflation overshooting and lower
debt. Fiscal policy increases spending and the government share.
A positive cost-push shock ηπ increases inflation, optimal monetary policy
rises interest rate in response. This leads to lower consumption and output
and a consequent reduction in inflation. Fiscal policy reduces spending.
The real exchange rate appreciates. Under commitment the interest rate is
raised by more which leads to bigger appreciation of the real exchange rate
and bigger fall in consumption. The resulting reduction in marginal cost
is insufficiently strong to outweigh the inflation persistence and deliver the
same speed of reduction in inflation as under discretion. The government
share rises because of the bigger fall in consumption and output.
A positive world-wide productivity shock AW results in the real exchange
rate depreciation. The productivity-adjusted output rises. The initial im-
pact on habit-adjusted consumption is positive because of the increase in
real wage following the shock. The higher marginal cost drives inflation up.
The optimal interest rate is raised. Government spending have to be lower
to control the accumulation of debt. Interest rate under commitment rises
higher than under discretion. This ensures quick reduction in inflation with
overshooting.
4.3 Model Fit
Table 4 reports the marginal data density for both policy regimes. This is a
measure of relative fit, and allows one to compare different specifications of
the model. A comparison of marginal data densities leads to the conclusion
that the regime of fiscal leadership in the UK can be best described as dis-
cretion. The difference between the log marginal data densities can be inter-
preted as log posterior odds under the assumption that the two specifications
26
have equal prior probabilities. Our finding suggests that the probability that
the actual data was generated by a model with optimal commitment policy,
rather than by a model with optimal discretionary policy, is less than 1.0%.
In interpretation of Kass and Raftery (1995), there is a ‘substantial’ evidence
in favor of discretion over commitment.
While the data density provides a measure of relative fit, we also present
RMSEs an second-order moments which measure absolute fit, see e.g. Jus-
tiniano and Preston (2010b), Rabanal and Tuesta (2010). Table 5 reports
RMSEs and second order moments for the data and the corresponding statis-
tics implied by the estimated models. We report means with standard errors
in parentheses.
The DSGE model under discretion produces good fit of standard de-
viations of all variables, in particular of interest rate and inflation. The
volatility of the output growth rate Ψt is slightly overestimated under both
discretion and commitment. The volatility of interest rate is substantially
overestimated under commitment. Namely these properties produce most of
differences in impulse responses between the two models in Figure 1.
Empirical autocorrelation of inflation is best captured by the commitment
model, while the discretion model underestimates it. Both models overesti-
mate the autocorrelation of the growth rate of output and underestimate the
autocorrelation of the government share. The autocorrelation of the terms
of trade is captured reasonably well.
Further, Tables 6-7 report autocorrelations up to the fifth order. The
autocorrelations generated by the model of discretion are close to the data
autocorrelations for all variables. However, both and discretion and commit-
ment models are able to match empirical autocorrelations closely.
To assess the degree of model fit we also report marginal data densi-
ties for reduced form vector autoregressions with four lags, estimated un-
der different Minnesota-type priors. More specifically, following Del Negro
and Schorpfheide (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and Adjemian et al.
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(2008) we populate the original data sample with additional artificial data
generated by the DSGE model. The relative importance of the prior informa-
tion can be measured by parameter λˆ = N/T where N is the size of artificial
sample and T is the size of data sample. We estimate the optimal weight,
λˆ, of either commitment or discretion DSGE prior in the BVAR model. Fol-
lowing Del Negro and Schorpfheide (2004) we call it DSGE-VAR or BVAR
model interchangeably. The relative importance of the prior information is
a measure of the degree of misspecification of the model. If λˆ is estimated
to be high then it means that the DSGE model imposes useful restrictions
to improve the (in sample) predictive properties of the BVAR model. Con-
versely, if λˆ is estimated to be low then the DSGE model is not coherent
with the data. Finding λˆ ≃ 1.0 suggests that the DSGE models do impose
some useful restrictions: Del Negro et al. (2007) and Adjemian et al. (2008)
demonstrate that λˆ = 0.35 is close to the point where the DSGE provides no
useful information, while λˆ > 0.6 demonstrates some coherence of the DSGE
model with the data.
Notably, the marginal data densities for both BVARs are almost identical,
see Table 4. Both commitment and discretion DSGEmodels impose similarly
useful restrictions. A comparison of DSGE and BVARs can help us to identify
the tightest restrictions imposed by the DSGE models. Table 5 demonstrates
that both BVARs improve the fit of the growth rate of output and interest
rate but at the expense of the fit of other variables. Figure 2 compares
impulse responses of DSGE and DSGE-VAR models under discretion. It is
apparent that the dynamics of inflation, interest rate and the terms of trade
is less volatile as implied by the BVAR, but at the same time we do not
observe any big differences in direction of responses and in their persistence
which is implied by this correction.
Finally, Figure 3 reports the historic and the one-step-ahead predicted
data under the two policy regimes. Both policy regimes result in very similar
estimates.
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4.4 Role of Fiscal Policy
We have estimated fiscal policy to be relatively inactive: although there is
a general consistency of the data with microfounded policy objectives, fiscal
policy does very little to stabilize the economy. Under our assumption of fiscal
intraperiod leadership this is the optimal outcome as the fiscal policymaker
leaves the stabilization work to the monetary policymaker. The monetary
policymaker, however, observes fiscal variables and takes them into account
when formulating policy. In this section we argue that the state of fiscal
stance does play a role in identification of the model.
The evolution of the government debt and fiscal spending are among
the identifying restrictions for the model. To assess the importance of these
restrictions we re-estimate the model excluding the government solvency con-
straint and treating the government share as following AR(1) process with
coefficient ρg. The monetary policymaker is assumed to act either under dis-
cretion or commitment. The results of estimation are given in Table 2, in
the last two columns.
Some of the key structural parameters appear to be different when the fis-
cal problem is excluded. In particular, the Calvo reset probability, the degree
of inflation inertia, and volatility of home technology shocks are larger when
the fiscal block is ignored; the difference is particularly large for the preferred
specification of the optimal discretion. The monetary policy parameters are
affected too once the fiscal block becomes exogenous: the monetary policy-
maker is less inflation conservative and operates with greater interest rate
smoothing. All these changes in estimated parameters are required to gen-
erate greater endogenous persistence observed in the data.
Table 4 demonstrates that the monetary model leads to lower marginal
data density. (There is also much less difference between commitment and
discretion.) The absolute fit is assessed in Table 5. Standard deviations of
interest rate, terms of trade and the growth rate of output is substantially
overestimated. The autocorrelation of the growth rate of output is underes-
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timated and there is a big increase in RMSE for this variable. At the same
time, the autocorrelation of the government share is much less underesti-
mated.
To understand these results we look at the role of the government debt
accumulation equation in the model.
First, the debt accumulation process is highly persistent both under com-
mitment and discretion. Its persistence propagates through the whole sys-
tem; in particular, in case of discretion where all reaction functions are time-
invariant and can be written as linear functions of predetermined states, the
speed of convergence of all variables, including debt, is the same. If we remove
the government budget constraint from the system, then in order to fit the
same persistent data we require more inflation inertia and higher penalty on
policy instrument movements. This role of debt process as persistent process
might be played by some other ‘slow’ processes, like the capital accumulation
process, which are omitted from our simple model.
Second, the debt accumulation process is potentially explosive. All eco-
nomic agents are aware of this and should take decisions which are com-
patible with non-explosiveness of debt dynamics. In particular, the fiscal
policymaker may optimally prefer to feed back on debt strong enough in
order to allow the monetary policymaker to concentrate on inflation stabi-
lization tasks. The monetary-fiscal model estimation results are consistent
with non-explosiveness of debt. Once the government budget constraint is
removed and the dynamics of fiscal instrument is approximated by an AR(1)
exogenous process, the monetary policymaker does not take into account
whether the problem of debt stabilization is resolved or not. This yields
higher volatility of interest rate to fit the volatility of inflation in the data.
Higher penalty on the instrument smoothing terms would result in higher
volatility of inflation, inconsistent with the data. This role of the debt accu-
mulation process as potentially explosive process may not be played by an
intrinsically stable process like the capital accumulation process.
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One can argue that the monetary policymaker alone can precommit to the
chosen plan, while if we estimate monetary and fiscal interactions jointly then
discretionary policy of fiscal policymakers results in the overall dominance
of discretion. Indeed, we find that the gap between discretion and comment
reduced once we excluded the fiscal sector from the economy. However, the
smaller difference can also be a result of higher estimated persistence of the
economy and the smaller role of expectations.
Finally, results from corresponding DSGE-VARmodels suggest that there
is a reduction in λˆ so the monetary DSGE model imposes tighter restrictions
on the data. The BVAR marginal data density values improve by about 80
units and are closer to those obtained in more general monetary-fiscal DSGE-
VAR models. Also, the first and second order moments are not as closely
matched as in the monetary-fiscal model.
5 Conclusions
This paper identifies the degree of precommitment in monetary and fiscal
policy interactions in the UK. We specify a small-scale structural general
equilibrium model of a small open economy and estimate it using Bayesian
methods. Unlike most of the existing empirical research we explicitly take
into account the solvency constraint faced by the fiscal authorities. We also
assume that the authorities act non-cooperatively, and may have different
objectives.
We find that the model of discretionary policy explains the data better
than the model of commitment policy. We find that both policymakers put
smaller weight on inflation stabilization than is socially optimal. The fis-
cal policymaker pays much less attention to inflation stabilization than the
monetary policymaker. The presence of fiscal block in the model plays the
important role in identification of monetary policy and structural parameters.
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A Social welfare
Social welfare is written as
W =
∞∑
t=0
βt
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)
Linearization yields
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where tip(3) includes terms independent of policy of third order and higher.
Production function (14) yields the exact relationship Nˆt = ∆ˆt + yˆt − AˆHt.
We substitute Nˆt out and use
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The linearized up to second order national income identity and the inter-
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national risk sharing condition yield
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Combining them allows us to substitute out the terms of trade:
yˆt =
c
y
(1− α)cˆt +
g
y
gt +
c
y
αη (2− α) σ
(1− α)
xˆt +
c
y
1
2
αη (2− α) σ2
(1− α)
xˆ2t
+
c
y
1
2
αη
(
α (η − αη + 1)− (1− α)2
) σ2
(1− α)2
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t )
2
−
c
y
αη (2− α) σ2
(1− α)
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t ) xˆ
∗
t + (1− α)
c
y
αησ
(1− α)
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t ) cˆt
+
c
y
αησ
(1− α)
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t ) cˆ
∗
t +
g
y
1
2
g2t −
1
2
yˆ2t + (1− α)
c
y
1
2
cˆ2t
Using
∞∑
t=0
βtxˆt = −
h
(1− h)
cˆ−1 +
(1− βh)
(1− h)
∞∑
t=0
βtcˆt
we arrive to
W =
∞∑
t=0
βtWt
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where
Wt =
(
−
x1−σ
N1+ϕ
(1− βh)
(1− h)
+
αη (2− α)σ (1− βh)
(1− α) (1− h)
c
y
+ (1− α)
c
y
)
cˆt
+
(
g
y
−
χg1−σ
N1+ϕ
)
gˆt +
1
2
(
c
y
αη (2− α)σ2
(1− α)
−
x1−σ
N1+ϕ
(1− σ)
)
xˆ2t
+
1
2
ǫθ (1− ζ)
λ
(
π2Ht +
ζ
θ(1− ζ)
(πHt − πHt−1)
2
)
+
c
y
1
2
(
α (η − αη + 1)− (1− α)2
)
αησ2
(1− α)2
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t )
2
+
c
y
αησ (xˆt − xˆ
∗
t ) cˆt −
c
y
(2− α)αησ2
(1− α)
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t ) xˆ
∗
t
+
c
y
αησ
(1− α)
(xˆt − xˆ
∗
t ) cˆ
∗
t +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)
(
yˆt − AˆHt
)2
+
1
2
(1− α)
c
y
cˆ2t +
1
2
(
g
y
−
χg1−σ
N1+ϕ
(1− σ)
)
gˆ2t −
1
2
yˆ2t + tip(3).
We are interested in comparing stabilization performance of different policies,
therefore we assume that a time-invariant labour subsidy offsets monopolistic
distortions, x
1−σ
N1+ϕ
= c
y
(
σαη(2−α)
(1−α)
+ (1−h)(1−α)
(1−βh)
)
.We chose χ so that g
y
= χ g
1−σ
N1+ϕ
.
This yields the quadratic approximation to the social welfare loss in the form
Wt = π
2
Ht +
ζ
γ (1− ζ)
(πHt − πHt−1)
2 +
λσ (1− θ)
ǫγ (1− ζ)
gˆ2t
+
λϕ
ǫγ (1− ζ)
(
yˆ2t −
(1 + ϕ)
ϕ
AˆHt
)2
+
2θλ
ǫγ (1− ζ)
(
1
2
Ψxxˆ
2
t + (1− α)cˆ
2
t −
αησ2 (αη − α2η + 1)
(1− α)2
xˆtxˆ
∗
t
+αησxˆtcˆt +
ηασ
(1− α)
xˆtcˆ
∗
t − αησxˆ
∗
t cˆt
)
+ tip(3)
where Ψx =
σαη
(1−α)
(
(2− α) (2σ − 1) + ((1−α)η+1)ασ
(1−α)
)
− (1−h)(1−α)(1−σ)
(1−βh)
− αησ2.
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B Theoretical Framework
Our model belongs to the class of nonsingular linear stochastic rational ex-
pectations models of the type described by Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
augmented by a vector of control instruments.
We label the two policymakers as leader (L) and follower (F ), and de-
note them with index i, i ∈ {L,F}. (In this paper the leader is the fiscal
policymaker and the follower is the monetary policymaker.)
The evolution of the economy is explained by the following system:[
yt+1
Etxt+1
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
yt
xt
]
+
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
] [
uLt
uFt
]
+
[
ǫt+1
0
]
. (30)
where yt is a vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions y0 given,
yt = [at, y
∗
t , ε
π
t , bt]
′ , xt is a vector of non-predetermined (or jump) variables,
xt = [πHt, xt]
′ where xt ≡ yt − gt. u
F
t and u
L
t are the two vectors of policy
instruments of the two policymakers, named F and L. uFt = it and u
L
t = gt
in the model. ǫt is a vector of i.i.d. shocks.
Each of the two policymakers has the following loss functions:
J jt =
1
2
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t(G′sQ
jGs), (31)
where j = {L,F} and Gjs is a vector of goal variables of policymaker i; which
is a linear function of state variables and instruments, Gjs = C
j
[
y′s, x
′
s, u
L′
s , u
F ′
s
]′
.
Commitment policy means that each policymaker is able to commit, with
full credibility, to a policy plan (Currie and Levine, 1993). Thus, the policy
plan has to specify the desired levels of the target variables (e.g. inflation,
the output gap, etc.) at all current and future dates and states of nature.
Assumption 1 At each time t the follower observes the current decision of
the leader uLt . The private sector observes both decisions u
L
t and u
F
t .
Assumption 2 At any time t both policymakers know Assumption 1.
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The follower observes policy of the leader and reacts to it. The leader
knows the follower reacts to its policy and is able to exploit it.
Assumption 3 Suppose at time t the private sector and the policymakers
only responds to the current state
 xtuLt
uFt

 = −

 NdFL1
F F2

 yt (32)
Assumption 4 At each time t the private sector observes the current policy
decisions uLt , u
F
t and expects that future policymakers will reoptimize, and will
apply the same decision process and implement decision [FL′1 , F
F ′
2 ]
′. At each
time t the follower observes the current policy decision of the leader uLt and
expects that future leader will reoptimize, and will apply the same decision
process and implement decision FL1 .
Problem 1 (Leadership under commitment) Under commitment policy
the follower solves
min
{uFs }
∞
s=t
1
2
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t(GF ′s Q
FGFs ) (33)
subject to constraint (30).
The leader solves
min
{uLt }
∞
s=t
1
2
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t(GL′s Q
LGLs ) (34)
subject to constraint (30) and to the system of first order conditions of the
follower’s optimization problem.
Policy determined by [FL′1 , F
F ′
2 ]
′ is commitment policy if both policymakers
find it optimal to follow [FL′1 , F
F ′
2 ]
′ each time s > t given Assumptions 1-2.
Discretionary policy means that the policymaker treats its optimal policy
problem, as described above, as one of ‘sequential optimization’, i.e. without
committing to any future course of action it makes the decision that is optimal
within that period only.
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Problem 2 (Leadership under discretion) Under discretion the follower
solves
min
uFt
1
2
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t(GF ′s Q
FGFs ) (35)
subject to constraint (30).
The leader solves
min
uLt
1
2
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t(GL′s Q
LGLs ) (36)
subject to constraint (30) and to the system of first order conditions of the
follower’s optimization problem.
Policy determined by [FL′1 , F
F ′
2 ]
′ is discretionary if both policymakers find
it optimal to follow [FL′1 , F
F ′
2 ]
′ each time s > t given Assumptions 1-4.
Finally, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (First order conditions) A solution to both commitment
and discretionary leadership problem can be written in the following dynamic
form:
zt+1 = Mzt, (37)
vt = −Nzt, (38)
where variable zt ≡ yt under discretion and zt ≡ [y
′
t, λ
′
t]
′ under commitment
and λt are predetermined Lagrange multipliers; variable vt = [x
′
t, u
L′
t , u
F ′
t ]
′.
Matrices M and N are functions of policy objectives QL and QF and of the
system matrices A and B.
Proof. We first solve the problem under commitment. Minimization prob-
lem of the Follower can be presented by the following intraperiod Lagrangian:
HFs =
1
2
βs−t(x′sQ
F
22xs + 2y
′
sQ
F
12xs + y
′
sQ
F
11ys + 2u
L
s P
F ′
11 ys + 2u
L
s P
F ′
21 xs
+ 2uFP F ′12 ys + 2u
F
s P
F ′
22 xs + u
L
sR
F
11U
L
s + 2u
L
sR
F
12u
F
s + u
F
s R
F
22v
F
s
+ λFy′s+1(A11ys +A12xs +D1u
L
s +B1u
F
s − ys+1)
+ λFx′s+1(A21ys +A22xs +D2u
L
s +B2u
F
s − xs+1))
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where Lagrange multipliers λFy are non-predetermined (as those on predeter-
mined variables) with terminal conditions and λFx are predetermined with
initial conditions. The first order conditions are:
0 = QF22xs +Q
F
21ys + P
F
21u
L
s + P
F
22u
F
s + βA
′
12λ
Fy
s+1 + βA
′
22λ
Fx
s+1 − λ
Fx
s
0 = QF12xs +Q
F
11ys + P
F
11u
L
s + P
F
12u
F
s + βA
′
11λ
Fy
s+1 + βA
′
21λ
Fx
s+1 − λ
Fy
s
0 = PF ′12 ys + P
F ′
22 xs +R
F ′
12u
L
s +R
F
22u
F
s + βB
′
1λ
Fy
s+1 + βB
′
2λ
Fx
s+1
The minimization problem of the Leader or Fiscal policymaker
HLs =
1
2
βs−t(x′sQ
L
22xs + 2Y
′
sQ
L
12xs + y
′
sQ
L
11ys + 2u
LPL′11ys + 2u
LPL′21 xs
+ 2uFPL′12 ys + 2u
F
s P
L′
22xs + u
L
sR
L
11u
L
s + 2u
L
sR
L
12u
F
s + u
F
s R
L
22u
F
s
+ λLy′s+1(A11ys +A12xs +D1u
L
s +B1u
F
s − ys+1) + ν
Lx′
s
(
βA′12λ
Fy
s+1
+βA′22λ
Fx
s+1 − λ
Fx
s +Q
F
22xs +Q
F
21ys + P
F
21u
L
s + P
F
22u
F
s
)
+ λLx′s+1(A21ys +A22xs +D2u
L
s +B2u
F
s − xs+1) + ν
Ly′
s
(
A′11βλ
Fy
s+1
+A′21βλ
Fx
s+1 − λ
Fy
s +Q
F
12xs +Q
F
11ys + P
F
11u
L
s + P
F
12u
F
s
)
+ νLu′s
(
PL′12 ys + P
L′
22xs +R
F ′
12u
L
s +R
F
22u
F
s + βB
′
1λ
Fy
s+1 + βB
′
2λ
Fx
s+1
)
)
where Lagrange multipliers λLy are non-predetermined (as those on prede-
termined variables) with terminal conditions and λLx are predetermined with
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initial conditions. The first order conditions are:
0 = QL22xs +Q
L
21ys + P
L
21u
L
s + P
L
22u
F
s +Q
F ′
12ν
Ly
s +Q
F ′
22ν
Lx
s + P
F
22ν
Lu′
s
+ βA′12λ
Ly
s+1 + βA
′
22λ
Lx
s+1 − λ
Lx
s ,
0 = QL12xs +Q
L
11ys + P
L
11u
L
s + P
L
12u
F
s +Q
F ′
11ν
Ly
s +Q
F ′
21ν
Lx
s + P
F
12ν
Lu
s
+ βA′11λ
Ly
s+1 + βA
′
21λ
Lx
s+1 − λ
Ly
s ,
0 = PL′11ys + P
L′
21 xs +R
L
11u
L
s +R
L
12u
F
s + P
F ′
11 ν
Ly
s + P
F ′
21 ν
Lx
s +R
F
12ν
Lu
s
+ βD′1λ
Ly
s+1 + βD
′
2λ
Lx
s+1,
0 = PL′12ys + P
L′
22 xs +R
L′
12u
L
s +R
L
22u
F
s + P
F ′
12 ν
Ly
s + P
F ′
22 ν
Lx
s +R
F ′
22ν
Lu
s
+ βB′1λ
Ly
s+1 + βB
′
2λ
Lx
s+1,
0 = A11ν
Ly
s − ν
Ly
s+1 +A12ν
Lx
s +B1ν
Lu
s ,
0 = A21ν
Ly
s +A22ν
Lx
s − ν
Lx
s+1 +B2ν
Lu
s ,
0 = A11ys +A12xs +D1u
L
s +B1u
F
s − ys+1,
0 = A21ys +A22xs +D2u
L
s +B2u
F
s − xs+1.
The system of first order conditions to both optimization problems can
be written as:
G
[
Ks+1
Ls+1
]
= D
[
Ks
Ls
]
where Ks = (y
′
s, µ
x′
s )
′ is predetermined variable, and Ls = (u
′
s, x
′
s, µ
y′
s )
′ is
non-predetermined variable and µy′s and µ
x′
s collect corresponding Lagrange
multipliers. Matrix G can be singular, so using singular form decomposition
(see Söderlind, 1999) we find the solution of the system in the form:
[
Ys+1
µxs+1
]
= Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11
[
Ys
µxs
]
,
 usXs
µys
 = Z21Z−111 [ Ysµxs
]
(39)
where matrices Z,S and T are obtained when solving the generalized eigen-
value problem. Note that S11 and Z11 have to be invertible, but T11 does
not need to be. Moreover, if D has any zero roots, then any transformations
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with Hermitian matrices leave them zero, and they are collected in the top
left part of T , such that Tii/Sii < 1.
Denote M = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11 , N = −Z21Z
−1
11 , and matrix N contains first
kF + kF + n2 rows of matrix N. Then, system (39) is written in form of
(37)-(38).
We now prove the proposition for discretion.
Solution to a discretionary problem in any time t gives a value function
for each policymaker i, i ∈ {L, F}, which is quadratic in the state variables,
W it =
1
2
y′tS
iyt (40)
a linear relation between the forward-looking variables
xt = −Nyt (41)
and a linear policy reaction function
uFt = −F
F yt − Lu
L
t , (42)
uLt = −F
Lyt, (43)
where L = −∂uFt /∂u
L
t : in a leadership equilibrium the follower treats the
leader’s policy instrument parametrically.
We seek solution in the class of matrices with time-invariant coefficients.
Given y0 and system matrices A and B, matrices N,F
F , FL and L, define
the trajectories {ys, xs, us}
∞
s=t in a unique way and vice versa: if we know
that {ys, xs, us}
∞
s=t solve the discretionary optimization problem then, by
construction, there are unique time-invariant linear relationships between
them which we label by N,F F , FL and L. Matrix Si defines the cost-to-go
for a policymaker i along a trajectory. Given the one-to-one mapping be-
tween equilibrium trajectories and {ys, xs, us}
∞
s=t and the sextuple of matrices
T = {N,F F , FL, L, SF , SL}, it is convenient to continue with definition of
policy equilibrium in terms of T , not trajectories. This approach has become
standard since Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus and Driffill (1986).
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The first order conditions on T are derived in Blake and Kirsanova
(2011). We substitute (43) into (42) and obtain equation (38) with N =
[N ′,
(
F F − LFL
)′
, FL′]′. We substitute (41),(43) into (42) into equation 30
and obtain equation (37) with M = A11−A12N−B11F
L−B12
(
F F − LFL
)
.
C System Matrices
System (17)-(27) can be brought to the form
πˆHt = β
θ
Φ
EtπˆHt+1 +
ζ
Φ
πˆHt−1 +
λ
Φ
(πccˆt − πc1cˆt−1 + πggˆ
y
t + πc∗ cˆ
∗
t
+πc1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1 +
σh
(1− h)
zˆt − (ϕ+ 1) aˆHt
)
cˆt =
1
(1 + h)
Etcˆt+1 +
h
(1 + h)
cˆt−1 − σc (rˆt − EtπˆHt+1) + cc∗ cˆ
∗
t
−
hα
(1 + h)
cˆ∗t−1 − cz zˆt
bˆt+1 =
1
β
(
bˆt −
b
y
πˆHt + bggˆ
y
t + bccˆt − bc1cˆt−1 + bc∗ cˆ
∗
t + bc1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1
)
+
b
y
rˆt −
b
y
ρzzˆt
yˆt = yccˆt − yc1cˆt−1 + yc∗ cˆ
∗
t + yc1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1 +
g
c
gˆyt
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where
πc =
σ
(1− h) (1− α)
(
1 + ϕ
(1− h)
σα
)
, πc1 =
σh (1 + (2− α)αηϕ)
(1− h) (1− α)
πg = ϕ
g
c
, πc∗ =
(
ϕ
(
1−
(2− α) ησ
(1− h) (1− α)
)
−
σ
(1− h) (1− α)
)
α
πc1∗ =
ασh (1 + (2− α) ηϕ)
(1− h) (1− α)
, bg = (1− τ )
g
c
, bc =
(
g
y
− τ
)
σ
(1− α)σα
bc1 =
(
g
y
− τ
)
(2− α)αησ
(1− h) (1− α)
h, bc∗ =
(
g
y
− τ
)
α
(
1−
(2− α) ησ
(1− h) (1− α)
)
bc1∗ =
(
g
y
− τ
)
α (2− α) ησ
(1− h) (1− α)
h, σα =
σ
(1− α+ αω)
ω =
(2− α)ση
(1− h)
− (1− α) , σc =
(1− h) (1− α)
(1 + h)σ
, cc∗ =
(
1−
ρc∗
(1 + h)
)
α
cz = (1− ρz)
(1− α)
(1 + h)
h, yc =
α (2− α) ησ
(1− h) (1− α)
+ (1− α),
yc1 =
α (2− α) ησh
(1− h) (1− α)
, yc∗ = α−
α (2− α) ησ
(1− h) (1− α)
, yc1∗ =
α (2− α) ησh
(1− h) (1− α)
Therefore, system (30) can be written in the following matrix form
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 β θ
Φ
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 σc
1
(1+h)


zt+1
aˆHt+1
cˆ∗t+1
cˆ∗t
rˆt
gˆH,t
bˆt+1
πHt
cˆt
EtπHt+1
Etcˆt+1

=
42

ρz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ρa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρc∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
− bρz
y
0 bc∗
β
bc1∗
β
0 0 1
β
0 − bc1
β
− b
βy
bc
β
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
− λσh
Φ(1−h)
λ(ϕ+1)
Φ
−λπc∗
Φ
−λπc1∗
Φ
0 0 0 − ζ
Φ
λπc1
Φ
1 −λπc
Φ
cz 0 −cc∗
αh
(1+h)
0 0 0 0 − h
(1+h)
0 1

×

zt
aˆHt
cˆ∗t
cˆ∗t−1
rˆt−1
gˆyH,t−1
bˆt
πHt−1
cˆt−1
πHt
cˆt

+

0
0
0
0
1
0
b
y
0
0
0
σc

rˆt +

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
β
bg
0
0
− λ
Φ
πg
0

gˆyt ;
Vector of goal variables
Gt =
[
x∗t cˆ
∗
t gˆt xt cˆt yˆt − AˆHt yˆt πHt − πHt−1 πHt
]′
= T
[
zt aˆHt cˆ
∗
t cˆ
∗
t−1 rt−1 gˆ
y
t−1 bt πHt−1 cˆt−1 πHt cˆt gˆ
y
t rt
]
,
where
T =

h
(1−h)
0 1
(1−h)
− h
(1−h)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 yc∗ yc1∗ 0 0 0 0 −yc1 0 yc
y
c
0
h
(1−h)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − h
(1−h)
0 1
(1−h)
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 −1 yc∗ yc1∗ 0 0 0 0 −yc1 0 yc
g
c
0
0 0 yc∗ yc1∗ 0 0 0 0 −yc1 0 yc
g
c
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

and the social welfare objective matrix QL,F =
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
0 0 0 q − c
y
αησ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 c
y
ηασ
1−α
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 g
y
σ 0 0 0 0 0 0
q c
y
ηασ
1−α
0 c
y
Ψx
c
y
αησ 0 0 0 0
− c
y
αησ 0 0 c
y
αησ (1− α) c
y
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 + ϕ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ǫζ
λ
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ǫθ(1−ζ)
λ

where q = − c
y
αησ2(αη−α2η+1)
(1−α)2
.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to one-standard-deviation structural shocks.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses under discretion
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Figure 3: The data and one-step-ahead forecast
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Table 1: Priors for Structural Parameters and Policy Weights
domain dist. p(1) p(2)
Structural Parameters
home techn. ρa [0,1) B 0.8 0.05
world output ρy∗ [0,1) B 0.8 0.05
world techn. ρz [0,1) B 0.8 0.05
Calvo param. θ [0,1) B 0.6 0.05
Habit persist. h [0,1) B 0.5 0.10
Inflation inertia ζ [0,1) B 0.5 0.25
Openness α [0,1) B 0.3 0.03
CRRA σ R G 1.5 0.10
Inverse Frisch ϕ R G 2.0 0.25
Monetary Policy Parameters
Conservatism ΦπM R
+ G 1 0.25
Smoothing Φ∆I R
+ G 0.75 0.25
Fiscal Policy Parameters
Conservatism ΦπF R
+ G 0.5 0.40
Debt ΦB R
+ G 1× 10−3 9× 10−4
Smoothing Φ∆G R
+ G 0.1 0.09
Smoothing ρg [0,1) B 0.8 0.05
Standard Deviation of Shocks
world techn. σz R
+ I 0.2 4
home techn. σa R
+ I 0.5 4
world output σy∗ R
+ I 0.5 4
cost-push σπ R
+ I 0.1 4
spending σg R
+ I 2.0 4
Notes: B stands for Beta, G Gamma and I Inverted Gamma distributions.
Parameters p(1) and p(2) list the means and standard deviations for all
distributions.
53
Table 2: Estimated Structural Parameters and Shocks
monetary-fiscal monetary
model model
discretion commitment discretion commitment
Structural Parameters
home techn. ρa 0.83
[0.77,0.89]
0.84
[0.77,0.90]
0.87
[0.82,0.92]
0.87
[0.81,0.93]
world output ρy∗ 0.84
[0.79,0.90]
0.83
[0.78,0.89]
0.83
[0.77,0.90]
0.82
[0.75,0.88]
world techn. ρz 0.87
[0.82,0.92]
0.88
[0.83,0.93]
0.85
[0.79,0.91]
0.85
[0.79,0.91]
Calvo param. θ 0.64
[0.58,0.70]
0.62
[0.54,0.67]
0.70
[0.64,0.76]
0.63
[0.57,0.70]
Habit persist. h 0.09
[0.05,0.12]
0.10
[0.05,0.14]
0.08
[0.05,0.11]
0.08
[0.05,0.11]
Inflation inertia ζ 0.64
[0.52,0.77]
0.75
[0.61,0.88]
0.79
[0.69,0.90]
0.76
[0.60,0.91]
Openness α 0.26
[0.21,0.30]
0.26
[0.22,0.31]
0.27
[0.22,0.32]
0.27
[0.22,0.32]
CRRA σ 1.23
[1.10,1.36]
1.22
[1.09,1.35]
1.19
[1.06,1.32]
1.19
[1.05,1.32]
Inverse Frisch ϕ 2.03
[1.64.2.42]
2.03
[1.63,2.42]
1.87
[1.50,2.15]
1.92
[1.54,2.26]
Standard Deviation of Shocks
world techn. σz 0.18
[0.15,0.22]
0.23
[0.18,0.28]
0.25
[0.19,0.30]
0.29
[0.23,0.36]
home techn. σa 0.38
[0.32,0.45]
0.41
[0.34,0.49]
0.92
[0.75,1.08]
0.89
[0.73,1.04]
world output σy∗ 1.15
[0.97,1.34]
1.17
[0.97,1.37]
1.30
[1.10,1.50]
1.30
[1.10,1.51]
cost-push σπ 0.14
[0.12,0.16]
0.14
[0.12,0.16]
0.14
[0.12,0.16]
0.14
[0.12,0.16]
spending σg 2.25
[1.92,2.59]
2.28
[1.92,2.61]
2.23
[1.90,2.57]
2.24
[1.90,2.57]
Notes: Mean and posterior percentiles are from 8 chains of 100,000 draws
generated using RandomWalk Metropolis algorithm, where we discard initial
50,000 draws. Convergence diagnostics were assessed using trace plots.
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Table 3: Estimated Policy Parameters and Weights
monetary-fiscal monetary
model model
discretion commitment discretion commitment
Monetary Policy Parameters
Conservatism ΦπM 0.91
[0.55,1.27]
0.92
[0.56,1.25]
0.78
[0.45,1.11]
0.90
[0.52,1.26]
Smoothing Φ∆I 0.90
[0.49,1.27]
0.80
[0.43,1.14]
1.09
[0.64,1.52]
0.92
[0.53,1.25]
Fiscal Policy Parameters
Conservatism ΦπF 0.39
[0.01,0.79]
0.35
[0.04,0.66]
— —
Debt ΦB 0.00
[0.00,0.00]
0.00
[0.00,0.00]
— —
Smoothing Φ∆G 0.01
[0.00,0.03]
0.01
[0.00,0.03]
— —
Smoothing ρg — — 0.85
[0.80,0.90]
0.85
[0.80,0.90]
Table 4: Data Density
type of type of data hyper-
policy BVAR density parameter
regime prior λˆ
Monetary DSGE discretion — −226.25 —
-Fiscal DSGE commitment — −231.65 —
Model BVAR — discretion −183.37 0.98
[0.70,1.24]
BVAR — commitment −182.20 0.98
[0.72,1.23]
Monetary DSGE discretion — −288.37 —
Model DSGE commitment — −289.52 —
BVAR — discretion −203.45 0.76
[0.60,0.92]
BVAR — commitment −205.05 0.74
[0.72,1.23]
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Table 5: RMSEs and moments implied by the data and models
data monetary-fiscal model monetary model
DSGE BVAR DSGE BVAR
with type with type with type with type
of policy of prior of policy of prior
discr comm discr comm discr comm discr comm
RMSE
πH 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
it 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11
Ψt 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.77
St 1.28 1.27 1.28 1.25 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.24
Ωt 2.27 2.30 2.30 2.32 2.33 2.33 2.34 2.33
Standard deviations
πH 0.20 0.18
(0.01)
0.20
(0.01)
0.12
(0.01)
0.15
(0.02)
0.20
(0.01)
0.20
(0.01)
0.13
(0.01)
0.12
(0.01)
it 0.25 0.31
(0.03)
0.41
(0.04)
0.20
(0.02)
0.26
(0.03)
0.37
(0.03)
0.46
(0.04)
0.20
(0.02)
0.23
(0.02)
Ψt 0.37 0.53
(0.03)
0.59
(0.05)
0.37
(0.03)
0.39
(0.04)
1.15
(0.06)
1.20
(0.07)
0.48
(0.03)
0.51
(0.03)
St 2.40 2.68
(0.19)
2.66
(0.20)
1.41
(0.18)
1.38
(0.17)
3.38
(0.19)
3.31
(0.18)
1.41
(0.15)
1.40
(0.15)
Ωt 2.22 2.28
(0.16)
2.29
(0.17)
1.37
(0.15)
1.39
(0.15)
2.32
(0.18)
2.32
(0.18)
0.94
(0.10)
0.94
(0.09)
Autocorrelations
πH 0.69 0.61
(0.00)
0.71
(0.00)
0.69
(0.0027)
0.80
(0.00)
0.69
(0.00)
0.68
(0.00)
0.78
(0.00)
0.73
(0.00)
it 0.92 0.94
(0.00)
0.96
(0.00)
0.93
(0.00)
0.95
(0.00)
0.95
(0.00)
0.96
(0.00)
0.93
(0.00)
0.94
(0.00)
Ψt 0.28 0.44
(0.05)
0.60
(0.05)
0.38
(0.07)
0.52
(0.07)
0.07
(0.03)
0.11
(0.04)
0.14
(0.06)
0.19
(0.06)
St 0.82 0.82
(0.00)
0.82
(0.00)
0.79
(0.00)
0.79
(0.00)
0.84
(0.01)
0.83
(0.00)
0.81
(0.00)
0.80
(0.00)
Ωt -0.16 -0.01
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.00)
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Table 6: Autocorrelations implied by the data and models
lag data DSGE BVAR
type of policy type of prior
discretion commitment discretion commitment
inflation, πH
1 0.69 0.61
(0.00)
0.71
(0.00)
0.69
(0.00)
0.80
(0.00)
2 0.23 0.42
(0.00)
0.41
(0.00)
0.57
(0.00)
0.50
(0.00)
3 0.01 0.21
(0.00)
0.22
(0.00)
0.40
(0.00)
0.33
(0.00)
4 0.03 0.05
(0.00)
0.11
(0.00)
0.25
(0.00)
0.21
(0.00)
5 0.07 −0.06
(0.00)
0.06
(0.00)
0.14
(0.00)
0.14
(0.00)
output growth rate, Ψt
1 0.28 0.44
(0.05)
0.60
(0.05)
0.38
(0.07)
0.52
(0.07)
2 0.08 0.06
(0.02)
0.10
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)
0.14
(0.04)
3 0.09 0.06
(0.02)
0.10
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)
0.13
(0.04)
4 0.04 0.06
(0.02)
0.09
(0.03)
0.09
(0.03)
0.12
(0.04)
5 -0.01 0.05
(0.02)
0.09
(0.03)
0.08
(0.03)
0.11
(0.03)
interest rate, it
1 0.92 0.94
(0.00)
0.96
(0.00)
0.93
(0.00)
0.95
(0.00)
2 0.80 0.85
(0.00)
0.86
(0.00)
0.81
(0.00)
0.82
(0.00)
3 0.64 0.74
(0.00)
0.74
(0.00)
0.68
(0.01)
0.67
(0.01)
4 0.51 0.63
(0.00)
0.62
(0.00)
0.55
(0.01)
0.52
(0.01)
5 0.42 0.53
(0.00)
0.52
(0.00)
0.43
(0.01)
0.41
(0.01)
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Table 7: Autocorrelations implied by the data and models - continued
lag data DSGE BVAR
type of policy type of prior
discretion commitment discretion commitment
terms of trade, St
1 0.82 0.82
(0.00)
0.82
(0.00)
0.79
(0.00)
0.79
(0.00)
2 0.76 0.71
(0.01)
0.70
(0.01)
0.68
(0.00)
0.67
(0.00)
3 0.64 0.61
(0.00)
0.59
(0.01)
0.58
(0.00)
0.56
(0.00)
4 0.57 0.52
(0.01)
0.49
(0.01)
0.48
(0.00)
0.46
(0.01)
5 0.53 0.44
(0.01)
0.42
(0.01)
0.41
(0.00)
0.39
(0.01)
growth rate of government share, Ωt
1 −0.16 −0.01
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.01
(0.00)
−0.01
(0.00)
2 −0.00 −0.06
(0.00)
−0.06
(0.00)
−0.08
(0.00)
−0.08
(0.00)
3 −0.02 −0.06
(0.00)
−0.05
(0.00)
−0.06
(0.00)
−0.06
(0.00)
4 0.42 −0.05
(0.00)
−0.04
(0.00)
−0.05
(0.00)
−0.05
(0.00)
5 −0.06 −0.04
(0.00)
−0.04
(0.00)
−0.04
(0.00)
−0.04
(0.00)
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